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Person-based factors inﬂuence a range of meaningful life outcomes, including
intergroup processes, and have long been implicated in explaining prejudice. In
addition to demonstrating signiﬁcant heritability, person-based factors are evident in
expressions of generalised prejudice, a robust ﬁnding that some people (relative to
others) consistently score higher in prejudice towards multiple outgroups. Our
contemporary review includes personality factors, ideological orientations (e.g.,
authoritarianism), religiosity, anxiety, threat, disgust sensitivity, and cognitive abil-
ities and styles. Meta-analytic syntheses demonstrate that such constructs consis-
tently predict prejudice, often at the upper bounds of effect sizes observed in
psychological research. We conclude that prejudice theories need to better integrate
person- and situation-based factors, including their interaction, to capture the
complexity of prejudice and inform intervention development.
Keywords: Personality; Individual differences; Prejudice; Intergroup relations;
Outgroup attitudes.
. . . if I take part in a race riot or strenuously and vocally support my local team during a
football match, or demonstrate against the oppression of my group by another group, I
interact with another group—as Sherif wrote—fully in terms of my group identiﬁcation.
However, the truism that marked individual differences will persist in these situations is
still valid [emphasis added]. (Tajfel, 1978, p. 402)
In the intergroup and prejudice literatures there exists an ebb and ﬂow between
explanations favouring person- vs. situation-based underpinnings of prejudice
(Choma & Hodson, 2008). These positions are frequently characterised as being
diametrically opposed, creating a deep schism in the ﬁeld (see Hodson, 2009). The
observation by Tajfel (above), one of the founding fathers of Social Identity Theory,
Correspondence should be addressed to Gordon Hodson, Department of Psychology, Brock
University, St. Catharines, Ontario, L2S 3A1, Canada. E-mail: ghodson@brocku.ca
European Review of Social Psychology, 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2015.1070018

























nicely captures the inherent tension between the situation and the person as explana-
tions. The ﬁrst portion is central to identity-based approaches and is widely
embraced by its advocates. Yet Tajfel’s followers pay less heed to his qualiﬁcation
regarding individual differences, despite the words “truism”, “persist” and “valid”
conveying that Tajfel never intended to negate the role of individual differences.
Rather, he sought to introduce a sorely needed social account of prejudice, given that
the ﬁeld at the time stressed personal factors (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; see also Allport, 1954, especially Chapters 25–27).
Although the pendulum then swung too far in the “social” direction (Choma &
Hodson, 2008), balance has more recently been restored, with individual differences
playing a central role in explaining contemporary prejudice.
In this review we discuss a contemporary understanding of the person-based nature
of prejudice, starting with a brief historical review.We then detail some central person-
based predictors of prejudice, starting with those most distal (e.g., heritable factors,
broad personality, values) to prejudice, followed by individual differences that are
ideological (e.g., authoritarianism) or cognitive (e.g., need for closure; cognitive
abilities) in nature. Even less distal and more speciﬁc to prejudice itself, we next
consider emotional predictors (e.g., intergroup disgust sensitivity), and individual
differences in factors regulating the suppression or expression of prejudice (e.g.,
legitimising myth endorsement). We then discuss the implications of recognising
person-based factors, both generally and in terms of interventions (e.g., intergroup
contact). We conclude by reviewing various conceptual models that incorporate
person and/or situation factors, making recommendations for modelling, research
design, and statistical analysis, before reviewing some limitations of person-based
approaches. In keeping with Allport’s (1954) monumental contributions in his seminal
book The Nature of Prejudice, we focus primarily on prejudice as a relatively negative
evaluation of outgroups, but recognise that this discussion at times encompasses other
processes such as stereotyping (beliefs about the characteristics of groups), given that
these inform an understanding of prejudice more generally.
Historical considerations of individual differences in prejudice
research
In The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno et al. (1950) provided a comprehensive
account of why some people, relative to others, are more bigoted and hostile
towards outgroups. This authoritarianism-account considered prejudice as an
expression of a basic personality trait that is psychopathological and largely the
function of internal, primarily unconscious processes (e.g., projection, displaced
aggression, scapegoating) rooted in exploitative, hierarchical parent-child rela-
tions early in life. That is, consistent with then-popular Freudian traditions,
internal conﬂict and suppression were posited to cause psychological problems
for the individual that were then translated into antipathy and negativity towards
convenient and (typically) weaker outgroups. A related but distinct account was

























provided by Allport (1954) in The Nature of Prejudice, a text that set the path for
our contemporary understanding of intergroup relations. He emphasised cogni-
tive rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity, coupled with fearfulness and concerns
that people are inherently bad (see Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011). Similarly,
Rokeach (1960) emphasised dogmatism (a rigid cognitive orientation) as an
individual difference variable explaining prejudice. In doing so, Allport and
Rokeach were shifting the conceptualisation of prejudice and authoritarianism
from the realm of the “abnormal” (or disturbed) and into the domain of the
everyday and the “normal” (see Choma & Hodson, 2008, for a review).
From the 1960s to the 1990s, the emphasis on individual differences subsided
considerably, replaced by concerns related to social–cultural norms, intergroup
relations and structural factors, and relatively universal cognitive processing (see
Duckitt, 1992). Many within the social identity tradition deemed that individual
differences were relatively irrelevant to the prejudice discussion (see Table 1).
Yet the contemporary prejudice literature reveals that individual difference
accounts now play a prominent role in our top journals. A PsychInfo search
reveals a noticeable publication spike, particularly since 2000 (see Figure 1a).
Somewhat dwarfed within the scaling of this overall trend, however, is an
interesting pattern in the 1950–1999 “post-war” era (see Figure 1b inset).
Bucking a trend of increased interest up to the early 1970s, a noticeable dip in
interest followed Mischel’s (1968) treatise, which criticised the predictive value
of person-based approaches, reﬂecting downward trends regarding individual
differences in psychology more generally (Swann & Seyle, 2005).
We suggest that three key factors underpin the current (post-2000) uptake in
interest. First, the effect sizes observed in the overall personality and social
psychological literatures are relatively comparable, both averaging around
r = .20 (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). Therefore, to the extent that
social ﬁndings are important, so too are person-based understandings. Indeed,
many prominent individual difference predictors of prejudice approach the
r = .50 effect size range (see meta-analysis by Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), ear-
marking them as some of the largest effect sizes in psychology (Anderson,
Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999; Hemphill, 2003). Second, psychologists have a
renewed appreciation that individual differences matter to human life and func-
tioning generally (see Choma & Hodson, 2008; Swann & Seyle, 2005).
Individual differences such as cognitive ability and basic personality factors
predict major life outcomes such as mortality, divorce, and occupational attain-
ment as well as (if not better than) situational factors such as socioeconomic
status (Ashton, 2013; Deary, Weiss, & Batty, 2010; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner,
Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). It makes little sense to recognise that individual
differences matter to a wide range of important social outcomes but not to
acknowledge that they also impact intergroup interactions and perceptions
(Hodson, 2009; Hodson, Costello, & MacInnis, 2013). That is, people differ in

























their beliefs, anxieties, ideologies, cognitive styles/abilities, and motives, and
necessarily bring these differences into intergroup arenas.
A third reason for rebound in interest in person-based predictors presumably
pertains to a robust ﬁnding within the prejudice ﬁeld itself. As observed by
Allport (1954):
One of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group
will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-
Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group. (p. 68)
Such patterns of generalised prejudice have been observed in multiple
studies, across multiple types of outgroups, in multiple cultures (e.g.,
Akrami, Ekehammar, & Bergh, 2011; Altemeyer, 1998; Ekehammar,
Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; MacInnis & Hodson, 2012; McFarland,
2010). Thus, those who score higher in prejudice towards Group X typically
score higher in prejudice towards Groups Y and Z, a ﬁnding also established
TABLE 1




. . . it may be misleading and inappropriate to locate explanations of
prejudice at the level of individual personality . . . it is not possible
to extrapolate directly from individual processes (i.e., personality)
to shared collective intergroup behavior (p. 433)
Reynolds et al. (2007) The social identity perspective . . . suggests that personality tends to
become irrelevant to prejudice where social identity or group
membership is salient (p. 519)
Brown (2010) For the majority [of people], personality may be a much less
important determining factor of prejudice than the many and
varied situational inﬂuences on behaviour. (p. 32)
Personality accounts of prejudice are limited because of their
tendency to down-play situational factors and to neglect the
inﬂuence of societal or sub-cultural norms. Furthermore, they
cannot readily explain the widespread uniformity of prejudice in
some societies or groups. Nor can they easily account for
historical changes in the expression of prejudice. (p.33)
Rubin and Hewstone (2004) Personality theories provide relatively inﬂexible explanations of
intergroup discrimination because they explain differences in
discrimination in terms of differences in personality that are
assumed to be stable across situations. (p. 837)
Hogg and Abrams (1988) With regard to personality, the point is not that psychological
constitution is irrelevant, but that relationships between groups
would be ﬁxed and invariant if they were simply products of the
stable and unchanging personalities of their constituent members.
In reality, intergroup antipathy can arise and dissipate within
dramatically short spaces of time (p.35).

























at the level of implicit biases (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004). Overall,
relative differences between individuals in generalised prejudice (and ingroup
favouritism) are remarkably stable over time (Zick et al., 2008) and signiﬁ-
cantly heritable (Lewis & Bates, 2010; Lewis, Kandler, & Riemann, 2014).
Such covariation of speciﬁc prejudices suggests that an underlying latent
“post-Mischel” 






















dip & rebound 
Figure 1. (a) and (b) Number of citations for prejudic*, racism, sexism, or homophob* with
individual difference, personality, authoritarian*, or social dominance orientation (PsychInfo).

























factor within the individual makes him or her more generally prejudiced and
intolerant towards outgroups relative to others in the population (in the same
manner that covariation between cognitive ability tasks suggests an underlying
generalised intelligence responsible for their covariation). Modern takes on
this basic idea have subsequently emerged. In a student sample from New
Zealand, Duckitt and Sibley (2007) have identiﬁed correlated but distinct
subdimensions of generalised prejudice: derogated groups (e.g., mentally
handicapped, Africans), dangerous groups (e.g., terrorists, drug dealers), and
dissident groups (e.g., protesters, feminists). That is, certain types of preju-
dices are more likely to inter-correlate than others, a nuanced position recog-
nising between-person variability in prejudicial expressions but also sensitivity
to group subdimensions.
VARIETIES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES RELEVANT TO
PREJUDICE
Genetic inﬂuences
Historically, theorists (e.g., Allport, 1954; Altemeyer, 1996) have emphasised the
contextual aspects of prejudice, emphasising processes such as social learning in
the transmission of prejudice and authoritarianism. But recent advances in
statistical modelling have also revealed considerable genetic inﬂuences. For
example, in a large American sample of monozygotic and dizygotic adult
twins, Lewis and Bates (2010) examined ingroup favouritism in the domains
of religion, ethnicity, and race. They found clear evidence of heritability regard-
ing both generalised and more domain-speciﬁc (e.g., involving ancestry and
kinship) attitudes, supporting genetic bases of ingroup favouritism. As is often
the case with heritability studies using samples of adult twins, very little variance
was explained by common/shared environments (such as family cohorts), with
the most predictive environmental inﬂuences being unique to the individual. In a
large German dataset containing both mono- and dizygotic twins, Lewis et al.
(2014) also observed heritable inﬂuences explaining considerable variance in
pro-ingroup biases and separate heritable inﬂuences explaining anti-outgroup
biases. Again, common (e.g., family-based) environments accounted for little
variance. Others have explored the heritability of constructs of prejudice-pre-
dictors, including social dominance orientation (Stößel, Kämpfe, & Riemann,
2006), right-wing authoritarianism (Lewis & Bates, 2014; Ludeke, Johnson, &
Bouchard, 2013; McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999), con-
servatism (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Lewis & Bates, 2014; Ludeke et al.,
2013), and religiosity (Ludeke et al., 2013), constructs that we explore in more
detail in later sections.

























Broad psychological individual differences
Personality factors (Big Five, HEXACO)
Personality theorists use factor-analytic procedures to classify inter-correlated
narrow personality traits into a few broad personality factors (Ashton et al., 2004;
Costa & McCrae, 1985). The most common approach is the Big Five framework
(e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1985), which includes Extraversion (being talkative and
outgoing vs. shy and passive), Agreeableness (being kind and gentle vs. rude and
harsh), Openness to Experience (being innovative and unconventional vs. shal-
low and conventional), Neuroticism (being moody and anxious vs. relaxed and
calm), and Conscientiousness (being organised and thorough vs. disorganised
and unreliable). Of these, Agreeableness and Openness are theoretically the most
relevant to predicting prejudice, with those friendlier and more pleasant, or more
open to new experiences and feelings and so on, scoring lower in prejudice. For
instance, Hodson, Hogg, and MacInnis (2009) administered a battery of person-
ality measures to 197 Canadian undergraduates, in addition to measures tapping
perceived immigrant threat and anti-immigrant prejudice. As expected, those
lower in Agreeableness felt signiﬁcantly more threatened by and more prejudiced
towards immigrants, and those lower in Openness were more prejudiced. In this
study, several “dark” personality constructs (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psy-
chopathy) were even stronger predictors of both threat and prejudice, out-pre-
dicting Agreeableness (but not Openness).
In the literature, low Agreeableness and Openness generally predict prejudice,
often in the r = .20 range (e.g., Akrami et al., 2011; Ekehammar et al., 2004;
Graziano, Bruce, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007, Studies 1–3). Relations between the
other personality factors and prejudice are much less consistent and lower in
magnitude. Or, as Turner, Dhont, Hewstone, Prestwich, and Vonofakou (2014,
Study 2) observed in a sample of 147 White British undergraduates, personality
factors such as extraversion (i.e., sociability) can indirectly predict less prejudi-
cial attitudes through greater cross-group friendships. As illustrated in our
Table 2, a meta-analysis by Sibley and Duckitt (2008) conﬁrmed that
Openness (mean r = −.30) and Agreeableness (mean r = −.22) were signiﬁcantly
associated with lower prejudice. Such effect sizes are equivalent to (or exceed)
the meta-analytic relation between intergroup contact and prejudice (mean
r = −.21; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).
More recently, the HEXACO model of personality structure (Ashton et al.,
2004) has become popular, with advantages over some Big Five approaches,
including better ability to capture the full personality space and lower respondent
bias such as desirability management (Lee & Ashton, 2013). Here, the
Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Openness factors resemble their ﬁve-factor
counterparts, but Agreeableness and Emotionality (or Neuroticism) are repre-
sented somewhat differently (see Figure 3.1 in Ashton, 2013). Agreeableness

























primarily reﬂects forgiveness, gentleness, ﬂexibility, and patience, and
Emotionality concerns fearfulness, anxiety, dependence, and sentimentality.1
Critically, this model introduces a sixth factor, Honesty–Humility, which taps
sincerity, fairness, and modesty (vs. slyness, greed, deception, pretentiousness),
TABLE 2




Sibley and Duckitt (2008) Openness −.30
Agreeableness −.22
Social dominance orientation .55
Right-wing authoritarianism .49
Whitley and Lee (2000)
(anti-gay prejudice)
Conservatism .42












McCleary et al. (2011) Religious truth .45





Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, and
Gaertner (1996)
Negative stereotypes .25
Rosenthal, Levy, and Moyer (2011) Protestant work ethic .19
Onraet et al. (2015) Cognitive ability (predicting general
ethnocentrism)
−.28
Cognitive ability (predicting speciﬁc
prejudices)
−.16
Costello and Hodson (2014b) Human–animal divide .34
All reported mean r values signiﬁcant, p < .05. Prejudice collapses across outgroups except where
noted. Readers are referred to target articles to learn of analysis properties, moderators, etc. Note that
Openness and Agreeableness refer to Big Five or Five-Factor Models, not the rotated variants from
the HEXACO.
1 To highlight one difference, sentimentality [vs. toughness] is part of Big Five Agreeableness but
HEXACO Emotionality.

























which is theoretically very relevant to prejudice (given that those higher in
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy score higher in prejudice; see
Hodson, Hogg, et al., 2009).
Recently, Sibley, Harding, Perry, Asbrock, and Duckitt (2010) documented
subdimensions of generalised prejudices towards: (a) derogated, low-status
groups (e.g., unemployed, obese) associated with low Honesty–Humility, low
Agreeableness, and low Openness; (b) dangerous groups (e.g., drug dealers,
immoral people) associated with high Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, and
Conscientiousness; and (c) dissident groups (e.g., protesters, feminists) asso-
ciated especially with low Openness. This study highlights that higher scores
on a personality factor are not uniformly predictive of outgroup attitudes; rather,
the nature of the target group (and/or its generalised subdimensions) is important.
Interestingly, this study found a rather noticeably reduced role for (low)
Agreeableness relative to studies using ﬁve-factor personality measures (e.g.,
Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Within the HEXACO personality space, Honesty–
Humility is conceptually more relevant to prejudice. This ﬁnding was corrobo-
rated in a HEXACO-based study utilising a Canadian undergraduate sample
(n = 136), where anti-immigrant prejudice was predicted by lower Honesty–
Humility (r = −.19, p < .05) and lower Openness (r = −.29, p < .001), but not
Agreeableness (r = .03) (Hodson & Ashton, 2009). Within the HEXACO frame-
work, therefore, the “darker” aspects of personality are best captured by (lower)
Honesty–Humility, along with Openness, and less by Agreeableness.
Values
Individual differences in values (i.e., broad guiding principles regarding how to
live) have been associated with prejudice and its correlates. For instance, Feather
and McKee (2008) examined anti-Aboriginal prejudice among Australians, ﬁnd-
ing that value dimensions such as self-enhancement and conservation (e.g.,
valuing power, security) are positively associated with prejudice, whereas dimen-
sions such as self-transcendence (e.g., valuing universalism and benevolence) are
negatively associated with prejudice. In a community sample of Australians,
Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, and Leeson (2006) found that attitudes toward
Middle-Easterners were more negative among those valuing national strength
and order but more positive among those valuing harmony and equality. Each
study observed values predicting prejudice through more proximal variables
(authoritarianism).
Ideological/intergroup constructs
Other individual differences lie theoretically between broad personality factors
and prejudicial attitudes (Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Hodson,
2009).

























Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation
(SDO)
Due to conceptual and methodological problems with Adorno et al. (1950)
theory, the authoritarian personality perspective diminished in prominence during
the 1960s and 1970s. However, this idea made a comeback in the 1980s with
Altemeyer’s (1996, 1998) reconceptualisation of right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA), which taps the covariation of (1) uncritical submission to and acceptance
of established ingroup authorities (authoritarian submission); (2) general aggres-
siveness directed towards deviants, norm violators, and outgroups (authoritarian
aggression); and (3) strict adherence to conventional, middle-class values and
norms (conventionalism). Contrary to psycho-dynamic explanations (cf. Adorno
et al., 1950), Altemeyer proposed that RWA is developed through social learning
processes, such as teaching and modelling, particularly during adolescence. RWA
is a powerful predictor of a range of important social and political phenomena,
including more support for right-wing political parties and candidates, capital
punishment, military-based aggression, and harsh sentences for lawbreakers, and
less support for environmentalism and international human rights (see
McFarland, in press). Yet the most widely studied correlate of authoritarianism
is outgroup prejudice, both in its generalised form towards multiple social groups
and towards speciﬁc outgroups (e.g., anti-gay bias). The correlation between
RWA and prejudice is often around .50 (see Table 2).
Despite its high predictive validity, RWA mainly focuses on the submissive
aspects of authoritarianism, whereas group dominance preferences are not very
well captured by RWA (Altemeyer, 1998). The introduction of social dominance
orientation (SDO) by Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle (1994) addressed
this shortcoming. The SDO-scale assesses preference for hierarchy and inequality
among social groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Many of the social and political
phenomena predicted by RWA are also predicted by SDO, with relations of
comparable magnitude (Hodson, Hogg, et al., 2009; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). For
example, Hodson and Costello (2007) administered individual difference mea-
sures to 103 Canadian undergraduates to model the indirect effect of interperso-
nal disgust sensitivity, a “general and distal avoidance orientation not linked to
groups or intergroup relations” (Hodson & Costello, 2007, p. 693), on prejudice
towards immigrants. Interpersonal disgust predicted both SDO (β = .36) and
RWA (β = .54), with each of these in turn simultaneously predicting anti-
immigrant prejudice (βs = .44 and .30, respectively). Importantly, RWA and
SDO are complementary, unique predictors of prejudice, both accounting for
different aspects, such as prejudice towards different types of outgroups, and
together explaining 50% of variance in prejudice (Altemeyer, 1998; Son Hing &
Zanna, 2010; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005).
This observation has led researchers to consider RWA and SDO as two
relatively independent core dimensions of ideological attitudes predicting

























prejudice. The dual-process motivational model (DPM; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010;
Duckitt et al., 2002) of ideology and prejudice proposes that different social
environments and different personality traits drive RWA and SDO, which in turn
lead to different types of prejudice: (a) Threatening contexts and socially con-
forming personalities (a combination of low Openness and high
Conscientiousness) promote danger-focused worldviews that feed into RWA,
which itself predicts prejudice towards “threatening” groups; (b) competitive
contexts and tough-minded personalities (low Agreeableness) contribute to com-
petitive-jungle-themed worldviews that feed into SDO, itself a predictor of
prejudice towards competitors and/or low-status groups. Meta-analytic evidence
(Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) conﬁrms the associations between low Openness and,
to a lesser extent, high Consciousness with RWA (mean rs = −.36 and .15,
respectively), and of low Agreeableness with SDO (mean r = −.29). Also the
relations between dangerous worldviews and RWA (mean r = .37) and between
competitive worldviews and SDO (mean r = −.53) have received meta-analytic
support (Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2013). Experimental evidence demonstrates
that inducing social threat increases RWA through increased dangerous world-
view, but exerts less inﬂuence on SDO (e.g., Duckitt & Fisher, 2003).
Longitudinal panel studies testing the different parts of the models are still
relatively scarce, yet published longitudinal studies conﬁrm effects of the
hypothesised personality factors (Perry & Sibley, 2012), worldview beliefs
(Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007), and perceived threat in society (Onraet,
Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014; see Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013; for a
meta-analysis) on socio-ideological attitudes.
Conservatism
There has long been interest in conservatism (vs. liberalism) in the intergroup
literature because conservatism affords priority to the status quo and tradition in
ways that have negative implications for less powerful and disadvantaged social
groups (e.g., gays, immigrants). Allport (1954, p. 431) concluded that
“Prejudiced individuals are more often conservatives”, with liberals “critical of
the status quo” and desiring “progressive social change” in ways that take power
from institutions to avoid entrenching biases structurally. Relatedly, Wilson
(1973) operationalised conservatism as “a generalized susceptibility to experien-
cing threat or anxiety in the face of uncertainty” (p. 259). As such, those higher
in conservatism, particularly social or cultural (vs. economic) conservatism,2 are
predisposed towards prejudicial orientations regarding lower status outgroups
(see Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Dhont & Hodson, 2014a; Hodson, 2014). Cast
in contemporary terms, the “core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to
2 For instance, Cornelis and Van Hiel (2006) found prejudice more strongly associated with
social–cultural (r = .51) than economic (r = .12) conservatism (ps < .05).

























change and justiﬁcation [or acceptance] of inequality” (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski,
& Sulloway, 2003, p. 339). From this perspective, RWA maps onto resisting
change, and SDO maps onto accepting inequality, and these dimensions can be
examined independently (see Dhont & Hodson, 2014b). But most researchers
and pollsters, when referencing conservatism, rely on self-placement ratings of
liberalism vs. conservatism (see our Table 2) or party identiﬁcation (Democrat vs.
Republican), of the sort we focus on below.
In general, those relatively higher in conservatism score more highly on
prejudice towards various racial outgroups (e.g., Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006;
Franssen, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2013; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Sidanius, Pratto,
& Bobo, 1996), immigrants (Hodson, Choma, et al., 2013), and the homeless
(Hodson et al., 2013). Conservatism, particularly social–cultural conservatism,
proves an especially strong predictor of anti-gay attitudes (Hodson, Costello,
et al., 2013), with a meta-analytic r = .42 (Whitley & Lee, 2000; see our Table 2).
To conservatives, gays threaten a traditional way of life, including marriage and
raising children, making them targets of dislike and scorn.
There are several explanations for why those higher in conservatism (vs.
liberalism) tend towards more prejudicial attitudes.3 A number of these explana-
tions involve the employment of conservative legitimising myths and beliefs
(Jost et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) to justify the status quo that generally
favours Whites and elites. For instance, in the United States, conservatism and
racism are related almost completely through their joint association with SDO
(Sidanius et al., 1996). That is, dominance concerns underpin the reasons why
(non-Black) conservatives (vs. liberals) dislike Blacks. But conservatism is also
related to other constructs reviewed in this paper. For instance, conservatism is
positively associated with heightened threat perceptions (Jost et al., 2003; Onraet
et al., 2013), lower Openness (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Roets,
Cornelis, & Van Hiel, 2014), and greater activation of the anterior cingulate
cortex, responsible for threat attention and action (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee,
3 Some argue that liberals and conservatives are equivalently biased against groups they consider
threatening (see Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). In Chambers, Schlenker,
and Collisson (2013; Study 1), liberals (vs. conservatives) show less favourable attitudes towards
Christian fundamentalists, anti-abortionists, wealthy people, the military, and so on; conservatives (vs.
liberals) demonstrate less favourable attitudes towards gays, civil-rights leaders, feminists, environ-
mentalists, and so on. Here, liberals dislike the powerful elites who impose positions or religious
values. Contemporary prejudice operationalisations, however, emphasise group position and privilege
(not only dislike). Liberals dislike groups holding and using power over others, and, therefore, their
attitudes function to dissolve (not entrench) hierarchies, unlike prejudices of central interest to social
psychologists as social problems. Examination of individual differences can provide valuable insights
into certain prejudices. For instance, whereas liberals tend to respond favourably towards Blacks and
the elderly, conservatives are more negative towards Blacks (“unconventional”, disadvantaged) but
positive towards the elderly (disadvantaged but “conventional”; Lambert & Chasteen, 1997). Such
nuanced interpretations are important in exploring “prejudice” from an individual difference
perspective.

























2007). Those higher in conservatism are higher in disgust sensitivity (Terrizzi,
Shook, & McDaniel, 2013) and intergroup disgust sensitivity (Hodson, Choma,
et al., 2013). Overall, conservatives are prone to negativity bias (Hibbing, Smith,
& Alford, 2014), presenting stronger physiological stress reactions to novel and
threatening stimuli relevant to intergroup relations. In terms of cognitive biases,
conservatives form more negative impressions of ﬁctitious groups (e.g., A and
B), overassociating the “rare” (i.e., minority) group with negativity (Castelli &
Carraro, 2011).
Religiosity and religious fundamentalism
Allport (1954) opined that “The role of religion is paradoxical. It makes
prejudice and it unmakes prejudice” (p. 444). That is, most major world
religions preach peace, love, and tolerance, yet they also target speciﬁc groups
(e.g., gays) for exclusion. Not only do religions differ from one another in
practice, but people differ in why they are religious (Altemeyer, 1996; Batson
& Stocks, 2005; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). People can be religious for
intrinsic reasons, the sincere commitment to the religion for its own sake, or
for extrinsic reasons, as a means to an end (e.g., gaining social status and
inﬂuence). Intrinsic religiosity generally predicts lower prejudice, and extrinsic
religiosity predicts greater prejudice (see Batson & Stocks, 2005; Hunsberger
& Jackson, 2005). Researchers then became interested in quest orientations.
Those scoring relatively higher (vs. lower) in quest orientation seek religious
meaning by asking questions and are comfortable with complex or absent
answers (Batson, 1976). A sample Religion as Quest scale item reads:
“Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.”
Such individuals theoretically express less (not more) prejudice.
Another individual difference distinction involves religious fundamentalism,
the literal and dogmatic interpretation of religious texts that deeply entrenches
categorical, us-vs.-them thinking (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Key to
fundamentalism is the belief in the absolute truth and infallibility of one’s
religion (McCleary, Quillivan, Foster, & Williams, 2011). Unlike orthodoxy
beliefs referencing religious content (e.g., Jesus as son of God), fundamentalism
is a more general attitude that one’s religion has particular access to truth plus a
unique relationship with God; these can promote feelings of superiority and
ethnocentrism (Altemeyer, 1996).
Several recent meta-analyses inform our understanding of person-based reli-
giosity and prejudice. Hall, Matz, and Wood (2010) examined religiosity and
racial prejudice in the US over a 50-year period. As summarised in our Table 2,
signiﬁcantly greater racism was observed among those higher in religious iden-
tiﬁcation, extrinsic religiosity, or religious fundamentalism. In contrast, those
higher in intrinsic religiosity or quest orientation reported signiﬁcantly less racist
attitudes. In a meta-analysis of anti-gay prejudice, Whitley (2009) found that

























homophobia was signiﬁcantly predicted by greater fundamentalism, church
attendance, orthodoxy beliefs, religiosity (self-reported religious conviction),
and intrinsic religiosity; in contrast, those higher in quest orientation were
signiﬁcantly lower in anti-gay prejudice (see our Table 2). In an extensive
meta-analysis examining multiple prejudices across multiple countries,
McCleary et al. (2011) observed fundamentalism (or “religious truth”) correlat-
ing signiﬁcantly with prejudices generally, especially homophobia (see our
Table 2).
Cognitive constructs
Need for closure (NFC)
In the course of several chapters Allport (1954) focused on the cognitive under-
pinnings of prejudice. As he observed, “A person’s prejudice is unlikely to be
merely a speciﬁc attitude towards a speciﬁc group; it is more likely to be a
reﬂection of his whole habit of thinking about the world” (p. 175). Thus expres-
sions of prejudice are characteristic of how people think generally and can be
understood in terms of general motivated cognition (Dhont et al., 2011; Roets &
Van Hiel, 2011). More speciﬁcally, Allport proposed that prejudice-prone people
prefer order and structure, liking familiar and predictable ideas and situations and
disliking ambiguity, resulting in narrow-mindedness. Recently, Dhont et al.
(2011) and Roets and Van Hiel (2011) have illustrated the conceptual ﬁt between
Allport’s ideas of the prejudiced-prone cognitive style and the concept of Need
for Closure (NFC). Decades after Allport’s formulation, Kruglanski and collea-
gues developed the NFC theory outside the ﬁeld of intergroup relations to
explain human knowledge construction and decision making more generally.
Dispositional NFC is central to this theory, the desire for a deﬁnite answer to a
question as opposed to ambiguity and uncertainty (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Desires for order, predictability, and quick and deﬁnite answers, plus discomfort
with ambiguity and closed-mindedness, constitute the NFC facets (Roets & Van
Hiel, 2007; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Critically, those higher in NFC
demonstrate higher levels of ethnic and racial prejudice (e.g., Dhont, Roets, &
Van Hiel, 2013; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004),
plus greater generalised explicit and implicit prejudice (Cunningham et al.,
2004).
For instance, in a series of studies conducted in Belgium, Dhont et al. (2011)
found positive associations between NFC and (a) modern prejudice towards
immigrants in two student samples (Study 1, n = 138, r = .21, p < .05; Study
4, n = 125, r = .16, p < .08) and (b) blatant anti-immigrant prejudice in samples
of adults (Study 2, n = 294; r = .42, p < .001; Study 5, n = 135, r = .46,
p < .001). Correlations in the r = .45 range between NFC and anti-immigrant
prejudice were also found in a sample of 169 Belgian students and one of their

























parents (Dhont et al., 2013). Interestingly, this latter study also showed that
greater parental NFC was related to greater offspring prejudice through parental
and offspring authoritarianism as mediators. Furthermore, two studies using adult
samples conducted by Roets, Van Hiel, and Dhont (2012; ns = 179 and 222)
demonstrated that NFC is also meaningfully related to sexism towards, and by,
both men and women, showing even greater predictive power than respondents’
gender (for both prejudice targets). Furthermore, NFC is negatively correlated
with the desire to engage in thinking activities, as tapped by the need for
cognition (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Cornelis and Van Hiel (2006) tested
the predictive value of several cognitive style measures, ﬁnding that NFC, and
particularly the need for order and predictability facet, was the best predictor of
racism. In sum, a general motivated cognitive style (NFC) represents an impor-
tant cognitive factor underlying prejudice across targets (Roets & Van Hiel,
2011), supporting Allport’s (1954) seminal ideas.
Cognitive abilities
In addition to cognitive styles (i.e., preferences for processing information),
theorists (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950) also proposed that prejudice and ethnocentr-
ism may originate in lower cognitive abilities—that is, capacity for logical
reasoning, understanding, problem solving, and acquiring knowledge.
However, contemporary theoretical frameworks explaining prejudice pay little
or no attention to cognitive ability (Dhont & Hodson, 2014a; Hodson, 2014;
Hodson & Busseri, 2012). Yet cross-sectional studies with various intelligence
measures across different age groups reveal differences in cognitive abilities
between those lower vs. higher in prejudice (see Dhont & Hodson, 2014a). For
example, Costello and Hodson (2014a) asked 6–10-year-old White children
(Study 1, n = 20; Study 2, n = 53) to complete measures of cognitive ability
and child-suitable measures of anti-Black racism. In both studies, a water con-
servation task was administered, assessing whether children comprehended that a
short stocky glass can hold equivalent water to a tall slender glass. In Study 2 an
inclusive categorisation task additionally assessed ability to sort objects (e.g.,
cars, trucks) into appropriate superordinate categories (e.g., vehicle). In the
smaller sample there was a marginally signiﬁcant negative association between
cognitive ability and racism (r = −.39, p < .07), and this same effect was reliable
in the larger sample (r = −.45, p < .05, Study 2).
Even more compellingly, longitudinal studies using representative samples
(Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008; Schoon, Cheng, Gale, Batty, & Deary, 2010) have
demonstrated that lower mental ability in childhood (i.e., ages 10 and 11,
respectively) predicts higher scores on an index of racism, social conservatism,
and gender inequality, in adulthood (i.e., ages 30 and 33, respectively). A re-
analysis by Hodson and Busseri (2012) speciﬁcally focusing on racial prejudice
conﬁrmed that, in two large-scale datasets (Ns > 7000), lower generalised

























intelligence in childhood predicts increased adult racism in both men and
women, even after statistically controlling for educational level and socioeco-
nomic status (SES). Given that the prejudice measures in such studies are
explicit, and that social norms regarding prejudice are also explicit and do not
require sophistication for people to follow them, it is unlikely that such ﬁndings
are due to differences in social desirability concerns between those lower vs.
higher in cognitive abilities (see Dhont & Hodson, 2014a; Hodson & Busseri,
2012). These relations are also robust: A recent meta-analysis investigating the
association of cognitive ability with right-wing ideological attitudes and preju-
dice (Onraet et al., 2015) revealed an average effect size of −.28 for studies on
generalised prejudice (see our Table 2).
To our knowledge, no single study has simultaneously investigated cognitive
ability and style, even though stronger endorsement of right-wing social–cultural
attitudes (e.g., RWA) has been suggested to explain why those higher in NFC
(e.g., Cunningham et al., 2004; Dhont et al., 2013; Van Hiel et al., 2004), as well
as those lower in cognitive abilities (Hodson & Busseri, 2012), show greater
prejudice. Scholars have argued that right-wing social–cultural ideologies are
particularly attractive among those with stronger desires for order, simplicity, and
stable knowledge because such ideologies offer well-structured and ordered
views about society that preserve traditional societal conventions and norms
(e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). By envisioning a strictly
structured and ordered society and emphasising the preservation of the status
quo, right-wing social–cultural ideologies psychologically minimise the com-
plexity of the social world and increase perceived control over one’s context
(Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2011; Stankov, 2009). As such, right-wing social–
cultural ideologies make societal complexity more palatable for those less able to
process and understand new social information and ever-evolving contexts
(Deary et al., 2008; Heaven et al., 2011). Taken together, individuals with
lower cognitive abilities and higher NFC are more likely to embrace right-wing
social–cultural ideologies such as authoritarianism, social–cultural conservatism,
and religiosity. Meta-analytic studies have conﬁrmed positive associations (r)
ranging between .20 and .40 for NFC with right-wing attitudes (Jost et al., 2003;
Van Hiel & Crowson, in press), a negative association of −.30 for cognitive
ability (IQ) with authoritarianism (Onraet et al., 2015), and a negative association
of −.24 between IQ and religiosity (Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013).
Recently, research on the relations between cognitive style or ability and
prejudice has been integrated into the Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation
(CASE) model (Dhont & Hodson, 2014a). This model (see Figure 2) proposes that
lower cognitive abilities and stronger preferences for simple structure, order, and
predictability increase perceptions of changing social contexts as threatening.
Threat perceptions trigger immediate prevention (vs. promotion) reactions empha-
sising the status quo to reduce uncertainty and anxiety. Threat perceptions and
prevention focus can further develop into right-wing social–cultural ideologies,

























emphasising resistance to change, protection of the status quo, and existing group
boundaries (Jost et al., 2003; Onraet et al., 2013), which in turn predict a variety of
intergroup variables, including prejudice and outgroup avoidance (Dhont &
Hodson, 2014a; Hodson, 2014). Endorsing socially conservative ideologies then
motivates interpretations of the social world as threatening, further reinforcing
threat perceptions, and entrenches existing beliefs (e.g., Onraet et al., 2014). In
sum, the CASE model outlines the psychological mechanisms through which
individual differences in cognitive style and ability mutually inﬂuence attitudes
and behaviour towards outgroups through threat perceptions, prevention-oriented
responses, and right-wing social–cultural ideologies. Future studies are required to
test the implications of this full model.
Emotion constructs
Intergroup threat
Intergroup threat refers to the notion that an outgroup can negatively impact the fate
or outcomes of one’s ingroup. Broadly speaking, people differ from each other
conceiving outgroups as realistic threats (i.e., to property, person, or ﬁnances) or
symbolic threats (i.e., to culture, values, beliefs; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006;
Stephan, 2014). As with intergroup anxiety, threats can be operationalised as
individual differences to the extent that people report their general reactions to
outgroups. Indeed, perceptions of outgroup threat can mediate (or explain) why
person-based factors [e.g., RWA, SDO, Dark Triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism,
psychopathy)] predict greater prejudice (e.g., Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011; Hodson,
Hogg, et al., 2009). Manipulations of intergroup threat can also strengthen the
relation between SDO and prejudice or (decreased) intergroup help (see Costello
Figure 2. The cognitive ability and style to evaluate (CASE) model of the effects of cognitive ability
and style on intergroup outcomes, via psychological processes (controlling for factors such as
education and socioeconomic status, SES). © 2014 By <<SAGE Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE
Publications, Inc.>>. All rights reserved. Reproduced from Dhont and Hodson (2014a) with permis-
sion of <<SAGE Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE Publications, Inc.>>. Permission to reuse must be
obtained from the rightsholder.

























& Hodson, 2011, discussed in the next section). Meta-analytically, both realistic
(mean r = .42) and symbolic (mean r = .45) threats predict greater prejudice,
uniquely from each other and from intergroup anxiety (Riek et al., 2006; see our
Table 2). Overall, those considering outgroups as relatively more threatening are
consistently more likely to dislike and disparage outgroups.
Intergroup anxiety
Related to the notion of threat, resistance to intergroup interactions and prejudice
often stem from intergroup anxiety, the worries and concerns about the “other”,
and the negative expectations that are associated with contact (Stephan, 2014).
Measures of intergroup anxiety typically ask the extent to which one would feel
emotions (e.g., awkwardness, worry, apprehension) in contact settings. As an
example of the use of such measures, among White British prison inmates
Hodson (2008) found that greater intergroup anxiety towards Black inmates was
associated with both greater SDO (rs = .50, ps < .01; Study 1, n = 35, Study 2,
n = 50) and ingroup bias (rs = .44, .41, Studies 1–2 respectively, ps < .01).
Although earlier work presented intergroup anxiety as largely social in nature,
recent conceptualisations recognise both a stable trait and ﬂexible social compo-
nent (Stephan, 2014). Typical studies asking about anxieties during intergroup
interactions refer to the trait-like dimension (Stephan, 2014), with some people
relatively higher than others in awkwardness around outgroups. Theoretically,
factors such as individual differences (e.g., authoritarianism) and situations (e.g.,
resource competition) elevate intergroup anxiety, which in turn predicts prejudice
and avoidance. There is some suggestion that relations between individual
differences (e.g., SDO) and intergroup anxiety can be relatively strong and
impervious to experimental manipulations of threat. For example, Costello and
Hodson (2011, Study 2) exposed predominately White undergraduates (n = 162)
to information that incoming Somali immigrants posed realistic threats (e.g.,
economic costs), symbolic threats (e.g., to host culture), combined realistic and
symbolic threats, or control information. Relative to control, threat manipulations
increased or decreased the relation between SDO and prejudice or intergroup
helping, respectively, but SDO was associated with greater intergroup anxiety
equally across control and experimental conditions. Of particular relevance to our
discussion, meta-analytic evidence (Riek et al., 2006) supports the notion that
intergroup anxiety predicts greater prejudice (mean r = .46, see our Table 2),
even independently of other types of threat (e.g., realistic, symbolic, see below).
Disgust sensitivity
Disgust has long been recognised as a basic human emotion (Rozin, Haidt, &
McCauley, 2000) yet is seriously understudied, relative to emotions such as
anxiety, with regard to prejudice. This is surprising given that disgust concerns

























aversion to having contact with unsavoury or “contaminating” others (Hodson,
Choma, et al., 2013) and thus is theoretically relevant to prejudice. This proposi-
tion has been conﬁrmed by recent theorising and research into disgust. In
discussing different types of groups as relevant to distinct threats (accompanied
by distinct emotional reactions), the socio-functional approach to prejudice
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) earmarks disgust as a relevant emotion to prejudices,
in terms of protecting the ingroup both from outgroup diseases and from out-
group values and beliefs. This line of thinking is consistent with a “behavioural
immune system”, whereby costly physiological responses to immune threats are
bolstered by overly sensitive social defences that promote avoidance of “others”
and outgroups in particular (Schaller & Park, 2011).
The properties of disgust make it very relevant to prejudicial attitudes, varying
through both contextual factors (e.g., disease prevalence) and individual differ-
ences (e.g., perceived vulnerability to disease). As noted by Rozin et al. (2000),
disgust signals danger and the need to withdraw from noxious or offensive
stimuli. Building on this position, Hodson and Costello (2007) argued that
disgust has properties relevant not only to danger and avoidance (and hence
associated with RWA), but also to purity, superiority, and hierarchy (and hence
associated with SDO). As such, disgust sensitivity is theoretically relevant to
understanding prejudicial attitudes, with several recent studies supporting this
contention. Homophobia, for instance, is predicted by both general disgust
sensitivity (Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010, Study 1) and by core disgust, a
subcomponent relevant to protection from offensive objects (Olatunji, 2008).
Hodson and Costello (2007) found that although general disgust sensitivity
predicted attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners, the interpersonal disgust
sensitivity subscale was an especially strong predictor, exerting inﬂuence on
attitudes through RWA, SDO, and outgroup dehumanisation. Interestingly, dis-
gust sensitivity was positively related to ingroup attitudes (see also Hodson,
Choma, et al., 2013), suggesting that this sensitivity is not a simple aversion to
others, but rather aversion towards outgroup others coupled with a draw towards
ingroup members. Disgust sensitivity is thus theoretically relevant given that
intergroup biases are characterised not only by outgroup dislike but particularly
by pro-ingroup biases (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). Future research, particu-
larly longitudinal and experimental in nature, can further explore the theoretically
claimed causal direction of disgust as an exogenous variable.
More recently researchers have isolated individual differences in intergroup
disgust sensitivity (ITG-DS), an “affect-laden revulsion towards social outgroups,
incorporating beliefs in stigma transfer and social superiority” (Hodson, Choma,
et al., 2013, p. 195) that is theoretically more proximal to prejudice than is general
disgust sensitivity. Those scoring higher in ITG-DS express negative affect (parti-
cularly disgust, revulsion) towards outgroups, contamination beliefs (dangerous
outgroups can pollute/alter us), and superiority (we are better in nature than them).
Among White Americans, ITG-DS has demonstrated strong test–retest reliability

























over four months (r = .74) and 12 months (r = .68; see Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth,
2014). Of relevance to our discussion, across ﬁve datasets (N = 708), Hodson,
Choma, et al. (2013, Study 1) examined whether ITG-DS predicted prejudice
towards several outgroups. ITG-DS repeatedly predicted prejudice towards
Muslims, foreigners, and ethnic minorities in the r = .40 range and remained
signiﬁcant after controlling for well-established individual difference predictors
such as RWA, SDO, and intergroup anxiety (Hodson, Choma, et al., 2013, Table 5).4
Moreover, individual differences in ITG-DS moderate reactions to experimen-
tally induced group disgust. Hodson, Choma, et al. (2013, Study 2) randomly
assigned predominantly White Canadian undergraduates to read a ﬁctitious travel
blog about an adventurer experiencing contact with isolated villagers. In the
control condition the villagers engaged in ordinary activities, such as preparing
food, or tribal traditions that were painful but not disgusting (e.g., manhood
rituals involving suspension by ropes). In the disgust condition the group pre-
pared disgust-inducing foods, engaged in taboo sexual practices, and took part in
rituals involving body skewering and kissing corpses on the lips. Across condi-
tions, the manipulation successfully induced disgust towards the disgust-eliciting
targets and heightened both perceptions of threat and intergroup anxiety.
However, only those higher in ITG-DS translated those emotional reactions
into prejudice towards the disgust-eliciting target. Overall, (intergroup) disgust
sensitivity appears to be a very relevant factor not only in predicting prejudice
towards outgroups, but also in moderating and shaping whether negative emo-
tions induced by an outgroup are translated into negativity towards that outgroup.
Rationalisation constructs
Prejudices often require “support” or “justiﬁcation” for their expression, given that
norms (certainly in the West) have shifted away from open expressions of bias
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). People differ systematically, therefore, not only in
the expression of prejudice, but in the accompanying justiﬁcations that legitimise
and maintain prejudices. Some of these can take the form of ideological attitudes,
as discussed above, but some can be more speciﬁc to the groups in question or the
expression of bias itself. We now explore some of these and their implications.
Legitimising myths and system justiﬁcation
According to Social Dominance Theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), a
variety of structural but also personal factors contribute to intergroup equalities
and prejudices. A key aspect of this approach is that “group-based hierarchy is
4 Recent studies ﬁnd no associations between general disgust sensitivity and prejudice (Choma
et al., 2012; Hodson, Choma et al., 2013; Hodson, Dube, & Choma, 2015). Rather, individual
differences in ITG-DS particularly predict prejudice.

























also affected by . . . legitimising myths . . . [the] attitudes, values, beliefs,
stereotypes, and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justiﬁcation for
the social practices that distribute social value within the social system” (Sidanius
& Pratto, 1999, p. 45). From this perspective, factors such as sex, group status,
and SDO impact discrimination and hierarchy-enhancing social policies through
myths (or ideologies) such as the Protestant work ethic, negative outgroup
stereotypes, nationalism, and so on. Stronger legitimising myths, it is argued,
more readily facilitate expressions of bias. Legitimising myths are routinely
measured and interpreted as individual differences, such that people differ in
support for the rationalisations and justiﬁcations underpinning intergroup
inequality. System justiﬁcation theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) similarly proposes
that people can differ systematically in their endorsement of the status quo,
including beliefs justifying the existing economy, political system, and so on,
in ways that promote intergroup biases. In support, Esses and Hodson (2006)
administered measures to 101 Canadian undergraduates, ﬁnding that those higher
in SDO or RWA expressed greater prejudice, in part, through beliefs that
prejudice is justiﬁed, normative, and “understandable” (i.e., acceptable).
There also exist individual differences in beliefs related to the harmlessness of
intergroup expressions. For example, Hodson, Rush, and MacInnis (2010) developed
a measure of cavalier humour beliefs (CHB)—that is, the extent to which jokes are
considered simply jokes, and thus fun not harmful. In Study 1, 135 predominantly
White Canadian undergraduates completed items tapping cavalier orientations
towards humour (e.g., “Sometimes people need to relax and realise a joke is just a
joke”), along with several prejudice-relevant constructs and ratings towards jokes
disparaging Mexicans (vs. neutral). Those higher in CHB scored higher in SDO
(but not RWA) and prejudice towards Blacks, and also rated Mexican-disparaging
jokes more amusing and less harmful. Thus, simply being casual about humour is
actually associated with intergroup negativity. Study 2 addressed this question system-
atically, having 177 predominantly White Canadians rate jokes disparaging Mexicans
(lower status), Americans (higher status), or Canadians (high status ingroup).
Critically, the jokes were experimentally sorted so that joke targets were rotated across
participants. For instance, for some participants a particular joke targeted Mexicans,
but for other participants that same joke targeted Americans (or Canadians). As such, if
those higher in SDO considered anti-Mexican jokes particularly amusing it would not
be because the jokes were objectively more amusing; rather, such associations would
be directly attributable to the speciﬁc target associated with the joke. Those higher in
SDO found anti-Mexican jokes particularly amusing and inoffensive, an effect entirely
explained by greater CHB. In Study 3 (n = 164), this basic pattern was replicated and
extended, demonstrating that exposure to disparaging humour also increased prejudice
against Mexicans, as facilitated by individual differences in CHB. Thus cavalier
humour beliefs serve as legitimising myths, fully explaining why those higher in
SDO ﬁnd jokes disparaging low-status groups harmless and inoffensive, in ways that
in turn contribute to greater prejudice.


























As with most life domains (e.g., Deary et al., 2010; Roberts et al., 2007),
individual differences matter in predicting and explaining intergroup prejudices.
Be they relevant to basic personality, ideology, cognition, emotion, or rationali-
sation, the individual differences we have identiﬁed correlate as much (if not
more) with prejudice as do traditional “situational” variables (e.g., contact). The
meta-analytic effect sizes listed in Table 2 are not insigniﬁcant by any standard,
with many reaching the upper bounds of associations observed in psychology
(see Hemphill, 2003). Individual differences matter, particularly (but not exclu-
sively) for predicting generalised prejudices (see Akrami et al., 2011; Onraet
et al., 2015; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008)—that is, understanding why some people
(relative to others) systematically dislike a host of outgroups. Moreover, general-
ised implicit and generalised explicit prejudices can themselves be correlated, as
represented in Figure 3. That is, implicit biases towards different groups can
covary (suggesting an implicit generalised prejudice factor causing their covaria-
tion), just as explicit prejudices typically covary, with the explicit and implicit
latent generalised prejudices then being inter-related. In such a test, Cunningham
et al. (2004) observed a correlation of .47 between implicit and explicit general-
ised prejudice. Such ﬁndings demonstrate that people meaningfully and system-
atically differ from each other in both their self-reported and more indirect,
automatic biases, and in their underlying common cause (i.e., individual differ-
ences in generalised intolerance). In the same way that “personality theories have
difﬁculty explaining how the same person can show markedly different degrees
of discrimination in different situations” (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004, p. 837),
theories emphasising contextual factors to the neglect of person-based factors
similarly have difﬁculty explaining how people can differ from each other in
Figure 3. Conceptual representation of relations between individual differences in implicit and
explicit generalised prejudice.

























their dislike towards different and diverse outgroups, even over time (see Zick
et al., 2008). Each approach, we argue, is well suited for a particular goal:
individual differences for explaining why some people are more prejudiced
(across targets) than others, and social factors for explaining why some contexts
elicit mass and relatively uniform changes (across people) that seemingly counter
personal attributes. These foci are equally interesting and valid enterprises, but
speak to distinct (but related) phenomena.
Broader implications of the person-based nature of prejudice
Recognising that people differ systematically in individual difference factors
predicting prejudices towards human outgroups opens up new avenues for
research, including biases in other domains, such as human–animal relations
(e.g., Dhont & Hodson, 2014b; Hodson & Costello, 2012; Plous, 2003) and
orientations towards the natural world (e.g., Milfont, Richter, Sibley, Wilson, &
Fischer, 2013). Recently, theoretical frameworks designed to explain prejudice
towards human outgroups have been applied successfully to the psychological
study of speciesism—that is, attitudinal orientations favouring one’s own species
to the detriment of other species. The interspecies model of prejudice (Costello &
Hodson, 2010, 2014) proposes that animalistic dehumanisation of outgroup
members is rooted in the belief that humans are inherently different from and
superior to non-human animals. Thinking of animals as inferior sets the stage for
the use of animalising metaphors with regard to outgroups we seek to dominate.
If we did not systematically undervalue animals, there would be no social value
in seeing human outgroups as animalistic. A series of studies (Costello &
Hodson, 2010, 2014; see Hodson, MacInnis, & Costello, 2014) demonstrates
that individual differences in perceiving a greater hierarchical divide between
humans and non-human animals is associated with anti-immigrant prejudice (see
our Table 2), through the facilitation of animalistic outgroup (i.e., human)
dehumanisation. Critically, experimentally accentuating animals’ similarities to
humans, for instance via exposure to editorials (Costello & Hodson, 2010) or
personally writing essays (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012), sig-
niﬁcantly reduces dehumanisation and outgroup prejudice (Costello & Hodson,
2010), decreases speciesism, and increases moral inclusiveness towards human
outgroups (Bastian et al., 2012). Thus, prejudicial attitudes towards human out-
groups are systematically connected to prejudicial attitudes towards non-human
outgroups, inﬂuenced by both individual differences and contextual manipula-
tions of the human–animal divide. Moreover, in a Canadian sample of university
students (n = 191), those endorsing more speciesist attitudes (e.g., “The produc-
tion of inexpensive meat, eggs, and dairy products justiﬁes maintaining animals
under crowded conditions”) also reported more negative ethnic outgroup atti-
tudes (Dhont, Hodson, Costello, & MacInnis, 2014), with ideological individual
differences in desire for dominance and inequality (SDO) accounting for (i.e.,

























explaining) the association between speciesism and negative ethnic outgroup
attitudes. That is, individual differences in SDO, a key factor in understanding
human–human relations, also underpin human–animal relations.
Furthermore, several other studies have reported positive associations between
right-wing ideological attitudes (SDO, RWA) and attitudes and exploitative
behaviours towards animals. Speciﬁcally, Dhont and Hodson (2014b) focused
on the psychological mechanisms explaining why right-wing ideological atti-
tudes positively predict speciesist attitudes and meat consumption in two Belgian
community samples (Study 1, n = 260; Study 2, n = 489). In line with previous
research (e.g., Costello & Hodson, 2010), those higher in SDO were expected to
hold greater human supremacy beliefs, which would in turn predict more spe-
ciesist attitudes and meat consumption. Theoretically, those higher in RWA or
SDO are more likely to regard vegetarian ideologies as threats to the dominant
status and traditional norms of a “carnist” ideology, which in turn foster specie-
sism and meat consumption. We found supporting evidence for the mediating
role of human supremacy beliefs (for SDO effects), and perceived threat from
vegetarianism (for SDO and RWA effects), in explaining the relations between
right-wing ideologies and greater acceptance of animal exploitation and meat
consumption. Even after statistically controlling for hedonistic liking of meat
(Study 2), the hypothesised associations remained signiﬁcant (see our Figure 4),
highlighting the role of person-based, intergroup ideologies. These results are
Figure 4. Mediation model (showing standardised estimates) of relationships between right-wing
attitudes and attitudes towards animal exploitation and meat consumption through vegetarianism
threat and human supremacy, controlling and meat-linking. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism;
SDO = social dominance orientation. Dashed paths represent non-signiﬁcant relationships. Model
ﬁt: χ2(149) = 307.24, p < .001; comparative ﬁt index = .97; root-mean-square error of approxima-
tion = .047; standardised root-mean-square residual = .039.*p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001. © 2014
Elsevier. Reproduced from Dhont and Hodson (2014b) with permission of Elsevier. Permission to
reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder.

























critical to our present discussion for several reasons. We again demonstrate links
between human–animal relations and constructs commonly associated with
human–human intergroup relations (e.g., SDO, RWA). But we also show that
some of the reasons why right-leaning individuals more readily exploit animals
actually involves a “pushback” against left-leaning vegan culture. Animals, it
seems, pay a price for human–human intergroup relations.
This nascent but rapidly growing body of evidence indicates that individual
differences relevant to understanding prejudice towards human outgroups are
also valuable for our understanding of how humans perceive and treat non-
human animals and the biosphere more generally. Biases towards human and
non-human outgroups have common roots in ideological beliefs centred on
dominance and status quo maintenance, providing new insights into biases.
Prejudice interventions (relevant to individual differences)
Prejudice researchers are interested not simply in explaining or predicting pre-
judices but also in preventing and reducing bias. This is by no means an easy
task. For instance, multiculturalism training can actually increase intergroup
categorisation (i.e., us-vs.-them representations) and stereotyping (Wolsko,
Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). Moreover, prejudice interventions can parti-
cularly backﬁre among prejudice-prone persons, such as when confronting their
values (Altemeyer, 1996), teaching or priming multiculturalism (Avery, Bird,
Johnstone, Sullivan, & Thalhammer, 1992; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010), or pairing
outgroups with positive stimuli (Sappington, 1976). For instance, Hodson and
Dovidio (2001) exposed White American university students (n = 84) to a
videotaped speech by a Black speaker. Participants were randomly assigned to
a control condition or a stereotype suppression instruction condition. Among
those scoring higher in anti-Black racism, instructions to suppress stereotypes
actually resulted in greater recall of Black (but not White) stereotype-relevant
words on a subsequent task, evidence of a “stereotype rebound” among prejudi-
cial persons. Relatedly, in a Canadian sample (n = 104), undergraduates higher
(vs. lower) in SDO acknowledged difﬁculty suppressing their negative outgroup
thoughts (r = −.32) or actions (r = −.20; ps < .05, Hodson & Esses, 2005),
highlighting obstacles to planning prejudice interventions.
For such reasons, researchers are often satisﬁed when interventions work
despite the inﬂuence of individual differences that promote prejudice. For
instance, Hodson, Choma, and Costello (2009) had heterosexuals engage in an
intergroup perspective-taking exercise simulating stigmatised outgroup member-
ship. Speciﬁcally, participants imagined and discussed their reactions to being
mistreated by aliens on another planet, with subtle parallels to how gay people
are treated in reality. Compared to a control condition, this intervention boosted
intergroup perspective-taking and empathy in ways that reduced anti-gay pre-
judice. These results held after covarying out individual differences (SDO, RWA,

























religious fundamentalism, conservatism), meaning that prejudice-relevant indivi-
dual differences did not detract from the intervention.
Fortunately, intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Hodson & Hewstone, 2013)
offers special promise for improving outgroup attitudes among prejudice-prone
persons, targeting many of the factors (e.g., threat) that characterise such indivi-
duals (Hodson, 2011). Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) meta-analysis of 515 studies
conﬁrmed the negative relationship between intergroup contact and prejudice
among people generally (mean r = −.21). Initially, Allport (1954) was rather
sceptical about contact interventions among prejudice-prone persons, stating that
“contact, as a situational variable, cannot always overcome the personal variable
in prejudice” (p. 280). Only recently have researchers directly examined whether
the negative association between intergroup contact and prejudice depends on
people’s levels of “prejudice-proneness” as indicated by constructs such as SDO,
RWA, and NFC (Hodson, 2011). Following Allport’s concerns, weaker contact–
prejudice relations might be expected among those scoring higher (vs. lower) on
these variables. In contrast to this idea, however, Hodson (2008) found that
White inmates scoring higher (vs. lower) in SDO showed stronger positive
contact effects on attitudes towards Black inmates in two prisons. Similar inter-
action effects were observed in Belgian community samples by Dhont and Van
Hiel (2009), who investigated whether RWA and SDO moderate the association
between contact with immigrants and anti-immigrant prejudice. Study 1
(n = 215) revealed that more frequent contact was clearly associated with
lower prejudice for those higher in RWA or SDO (β = −.23 and β = −.28,
ps < .01) but not for those lower in RWA or SDO (β = .00, p > .99, and β = −.13,
p < .08). Study 2 (n = 90) also took the quality of intergroup contact into
account, revealing that more positive contact was signiﬁcantly related to lower
prejudice among high RWA and SDO scorers (β = −.35 and β = −.33, ps < .01),
but not among low RWA and SDO scorers (β = −.10, and β = −.09, ns) (see our
Figure 5, Panel A). The moderating role of RWA in the contact–prejudice
relation has also been replicated among British students (n = 115), for direct
contact with homosexuals, and for indirect or extended contact (i.e., having
ingroup friends with outgroup friendships; Hodson, Harry, & Mitchell, 2009).
This pattern has also been observed with representative survey data (n = 1238)
for both direct and extended contact with immigrants in the Netherlands (Dhont
& Van Hiel, 2011), and longitudinally for contact with immigrants in Germany
(Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012). Additionally, Hodson, Hogg, et al.
(2009) found that highly identiﬁed heterosexuals particularly beneﬁted more
from contact with homosexuals.
Others have addressed whether intergroup contact works similarly well among
cognitively rigid and closed-minded individuals (i.e., high NFC scorers). In the
four cross-sectional studies discussed earlier, Dhont et al. (2011) consistently
found that individuals higher (vs. lower) on NFC showed signiﬁcantly stronger
contact effects in predicting lower ethnic prejudice including modern (Studies 1,

























4, and 5) and blatant (Studies 2 and 5) prejudice, as well as hostile behavioural
tendencies (Study 5). A similar interaction also emerged for extended contact
(Study 2). Moreover, in a quasi-experimental ﬁeld study (Study 3, n = 60),
Belgian high-school students participating in a contact-intensive school trip to
Morocco showed lower prejudice than a control group, with the effect ampliﬁed
among high NFC scorers. Furthermore, Studies 4 and 5 showed that intergroup
anxiety mediated the interaction patterns between NFC and intergroup contact;
that is, those who feel most uncertain and fearful of the unfamiliar and ambig-
uous are the ones who beneﬁt the most from intergroup contact due to the
anxiety-reducing effect of intergroup contact.
Overall, these Person × Situation patterns are encouraging, suggesting that
contact may effectively reduce prejudice among those most in need of interven-
tion (Dhont et al., 2011; Hodson, 2011; Hodson, Costello, et al., 2013). These
patterns also suggest that, by ignoring individual differences, the beneﬁts of
contact have been historically underestimated (Hodson, 2011; Hodson, Hogg,
et al., 2009), with clear implications for policy implementation and education. To
Figure 5. Association of positive contact (Panel A) or negative contact (Panel B) with anti-immigrant
prejudice as a function of individual differences in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social
dominance orientation (SDO). © 2009 Elsevier. Reproduced from Dhont and Van Hiel (2009) with
permission of Elsevier. Permission to reuse must be obtained from the rightsholder.

























some extent such ﬁndings reﬂect the fact that those lower in prejudice-prone
individual differences have less room to improve their attitudes. But we need to
keep in mind the societal relevance of improving attitudes among those relatively
higher in prejudice, given that such individuals often prove immune to (or
reactive against) other types of prejudice intervention. As argued by Hodson
(2011), it is important that contact interventions demonstrably alleviate prejudice
among those most in need of intervention, in the same manner that it is critical to
demonstrate that sleep-inducing drugs work among those most (not least) in need
of sleep intervention. Drawing attention to how sleep drugs are less effective
among those without sleep concerns misses the point that sleep drugs can exert
desired sleep-inducement effects among those with sleep problems (i.e., the
treatment population). It is important to evaluate whether a treatment (contact,
sleep drugs) is effective among the population requiring intervention.
Not all studies converge on the conclusion that contact works, particularly
with regard to SDO. Whereas Asbrock et al. (2012) observed stronger effects of
contact with immigrants among those relatively higher (vs. lower) in RWA,
those higher (vs. lower) in SDO showed weaker or no contact effects. Likewise,
in representative samples of eight European countries, Schmid, Hewstone,
Küpper, Zick, and Wagner (2012) found weaker contact effects among those
higher (vs. lower) in SDO. However, the large-scale nature of these survey
projects necessitated a very restricted number of SDO items in the survey,
resulting in low reliability that limits ﬁrm conclusions. Moreover, intergroup
contact can effectively reduce SDO levels (Dhont, Van Hiel, & Hewstone,
2014; Shook, Hopkins, & Koech, in press). In an intergroup contact interven-
tion study among Belgian high-school students (Study 1, n = 71), Dhont, Van
Hiel, et al. (2014) measured students’ levels of SDO before and after a school
trip to Morocco involving intergroup contact activities such as hiking and
visiting Moroccan families. Lower SDO levels were observed after the inter-
vention, especially among students reporting a higher quality of contact during
the trip. A longitudinal survey study among Belgian adults (Study 2, n = 363)
further demonstrated the attenuating effect of positive intergroup contact on
SDO over three-month time interval, whereas the longitudinal path from SDO
to intergroup contact was not signiﬁcant.
Overall, such ﬁndings point to the need for additional research on the
beneﬁts of contact among those higher in SDO. It remains a challenge, for
instance, to bring prejudice-prone people to contact settings. Furthermore, if
contact cannot be set up to be positive, there is a serious risk of worsening
outgroup attitudes, particularly among prejudice-prone people. Indeed, the
effects of negative contact can be more inﬂuential in increasing prejudice
than are the effects of positive contact in reducing prejudice (e.g., Dhont,
Cornelis, & Van Hiel, 2010; Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin, 2010) and also
show particularly strong effects among those higher on RWA or SDO (Dhont
& Van Hiel, 2009; see our Figure 5 Panel B).

























Thinking straight about persons and situations
So where does this leave the discipline of psychology, and social psychology, in
particular? We argue for further integration of individual differences into main-
stream social psychological theorising (e.g., Dhont & Hodson, 2014a; Hodson,
2014). Fierce battles over person vs. situation have proven unable to capture the
complexities of human psychology. Biological science has long since cast aside
rigid positions on nature vs. nurture, ﬁnding greater explanatory power in their
conﬂuence and interaction. Moreover, from a psychological perspective, social
phenomena are not purely personal or situational. Instead, social events are
internally (i.e., psychologically) construed, and personal factors are derived
from and play out through social contexts and interactions. Here again,
approaches adopted by the biological sciences are informative. For instance,
the expression of genes is determined through contextual factors, such that the
heritability of cognitive ability is stronger among those higher (vs. lower) in SES,
given their greater ability to “evoke and select positive learning experiences on
the basis of their genetic predispositions” (Tucker-Drob, Briley, & Harden, 2013,
p. 349). This line of thinking offers meaningful guidance for the future of
prejudice research, as we seek to understand the contextual factors that release
or inhibit expressions of internal dispositions, and better understand how indivi-
duals select themselves into and shape their contexts.
Thinking conceptually (observations)
To assist theorists in thinking clearly about person- and situation-based bases of
prejudice, we provide an overview of various frameworks in Figure 6. Panel A
presents a relatively straightforward view that person-based factors play a central
role in explaining prejudice. Examples of such thinking are found in the work of
Adorno et al. (1950), who focused heavily on dysfunctional features of intrap-
sychic processes, and Rokeach (1960), who emphasised dogmatic thinking
styles. Panel B presents an alternative take that stresses social and contextual
factors as the causes of prejudice, common in sociological research and social
identity and self-categorisation research (as per Table 1). This position largely
discounts personality and individual differences as relevant to the discussion.
Theoretical frameworks such as the dual-process motivational model (DPM;
Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) and social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto,
1999), much of which can be captured by Panel C, have become increasingly
popular. Such theories emphasise that person and situation variables are both
important in explaining prejudice. As noted above, the DPM stresses person
factors (e.g., tough-mindedness) and social factors (threatening or competitive
contexts) as predictors of prejudice, operating through SDO and RWA. The ﬁrst
stage of DPM largely treats person and situation effects as additive in their
prediction of ideology and prejudice, as per Panel C of Figure 6. For its part,

























SDT emphasises structural features of human societies (i.e., higher level forces)
but also individual differences, especially SDO, which generally serve to
entrench and justify inequalities between groups. Without doubt, these two
perspectives are among the most dominant and inﬂuential contemporary accounts
of prejudice by virtue of integrating personal and situational effects.
Panels D and E (Figure 6) include the additive effects of person and situation
but also incorporate interactive effects. The theoretical framework in Panel D
conceptually emphasises person effects on prejudice, recognising that these
effects are qualiﬁed by contextual factors. Although Altemeyer’s (1996) work
on RWA is often considered representative of Panel A, he explicitly stressed
contextual moderation, observing that “[RWA] is an individual difference vari-
able . . . developed on the premise that some people would need little situation
pressure to (say) submit to authority and attack others, while others require
signiﬁcantly more” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 8). For instance, participants in
Milgram’s classic obedience studies varied in the degree to which they needed
“prodding” to conduct aggressive acts on others. Here, the social context is like a
switch or pedal/brake that determines how much and when personal factors
become relevant. Such emphasis has proven useful in discovering that individual
Figure 6. Personal and situational inﬂuences on prejudice (conceptual patterns).

























differences in intergroup disgust sensitivity are strong predictors of prejudice
under manipulations of fear (Choma, Hodson, & Costello, 2012), but weak
predictors under simulated contact conditions that enhance outgroup trust
(Hodson, Dube, & Choma, 2015). Likewise, the DPM proposes that the degree
to which RWA and SDO predict prejudice depends on the contextual levels of
outgroup threat (for RWA effects) or competition (for SDO effects; Duckitt &
Sibley, 2010). In Panel E (Figure 6) theorists are largely interested in how effects
of the social conditions predict prejudice, as moderated by person-based factors.
This line of thinking was emphasised previously in our discussion of contact
(e.g., Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; Hodson, 2008). The differences between Panels
D and E are largely conceptual, not statistical, and thus vary in utility depending
on the research goals. These approaches share an explicit modelling of person
and situation effects plus their interaction.
Recommendations for thinking conceptually
Each of the models in Figure 6 has both strengths and weaknesses. Given space
concerns, our review has focused mainly on person-effects (as in Panel A) to
push the argument that person-based factors are theoretically and practically
relevant, but we consider this a ﬁrst step in better integrating conceptual
approaches that have largely developed in isolation from each other. In fact,
few consider person-based factors to be the sole explanations of prejudice. With
this in mind, we encourage readers to interpret the person effects in Table 2 as
main effects that presumably are expressed through contextual moderators. Panel
B only models situational predictors, yet our review suggests that this approach
is unlikely to offer a complete account of prejudice, in keeping with Tajfel
(1978). Indeed, Panels A and B are equally and unduly narrow in focus. As
we have argued, a relatively exclusive person-based account (Panel A) provides a
strong account of generalised prejudice, but a weaker account of (sudden) shifts
in attitudes among groups or societies. Likewise, a relatively exclusive situation-
based account (Panel B) provides a strong account of prejudices towards speciﬁc
targets in situ (e.g., Muslims after 9/11), but offers little explanation for why
some people (relative to others) demonstrate relatively stable dislike towards
multiple outgroups. Each approach tends to treat the alternative factor (person or
situation) as error variance not theoretically important enough to be modelled,
resulting in an incomplete understanding of the nature of prejudice and its
dynamics.
We argue that Panels C through E (Figure 6) more fully capture prejudice as a
personal and social phenomenon. Model C beneﬁts from simplicity and parsi-
mony, and manages to capture both the person and the situation. However, it
considers these factors in isolation, after statistically controlling for the effects of
the other (i.e., as main effects). A general limitation with Panels A through E
concerns their inadequate modelling of how person and situation effects impact

























each other. Future researchers are encouraged to incorporate reciprocal relations
where feasible or possible. Overall, we recommend that researchers utilise
Models D and E; these models test the main effects from Models A–C, and
isolate their unique variance, but also consider the inﬂuence of each factor as a
function of the other. As with all of the models, we also recommend both
measuring and manipulating social factors, and considering manipulations of
person-variables (or their underlying construct, for instance “anxiety”) where
meaningful. Of course, most prejudice-relevant research questions can and
should be modelled longitudinally to assess inﬂuence over time, a feature
applicable to each model in Figure 6. Finally, researchers are encouraged to
utilise modern statistical techniques such as multilevel modelling (MLM),
whereby effects of the situation (as per Panels B, C, and D) can be tested at an
individual but also a contextual level. For instance, contact effects can be tested
at the personal level but also at the level of “context” (e.g., neighbourhood or
country), considering macro- and micro-level effects (e.g., Christ et al., 2014).
Semantic issues
Conceptually, it is important to recognise that the terms “personal” and “social”
are themselves social and scientiﬁc constructions that should be handled
with care and consideration (for a fuller discussion, see Hodson, Costello,
et al., 2013, pp. 64–65). That is, many constructs routinely considered by social
psychologists as “social” (e.g., intergroup anxiety, ingroup identiﬁcation) can be
conceptualised as individual or personal factors. In many (if not most) of these
studies, people complete measures in the absence of experimental manipulations
and, more to the point, systematically differ from each other in these psycholo-
gical constructs. Similarly, many personal factors (e.g., authoritarianism) are
shaped by contextual factors such as peer groups and mass media. Of course,
levels of abstraction presumably play a role. At the highest level, generalised
prejudice represents an individual-level (i.e., between-person) construct; at the
lowest level, speciﬁc prejudices (e.g., homophobia) can reﬂect structural aspects
of the context that isolate a particular group (at a time point) as a target of
prejudice through personal and situational experiences. By examining subdimen-
sions of generalised prejudices (i.e., derogated, dangerous, and dissident groups),
whereby speciﬁc types of prejudices are more closely inter-related than others,
Duckitt and Sibley (2007) presumably tap the joint inﬂuence of personal and
contextual factors. That is, although particular subgroupings presumably differ
across cultures and/or time points within a culture, individual differences in
prejudice towards subgroups within time points or cultures would nonetheless
emerge (such that some people are more prejudicial than others towards members
of groups within a subgroup). This line of investigation warrants further
consideration.

























Limitations to person-based approaches
Thinking straight about person-based factors as prejudice predictors also involves
a consideration of limitations and issues associated with this approach. For
instance, most research involves self-reported individual differences and inter-
group attitudes, which can inﬂate associations due to common method variance
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959). This is a valid concern worth recognising.
Fortunately, research involving peer or interviewer assessment of the individual
difference constructs corroborate those with self-report-only ﬁndings (e.g., see
Cohrs, Kämpfe-Hargrave, & Riemann, 2012; Lippa & Arad, 1999), suggesting
that common method variance alone does not explain observed associations.
Moreover, many individual differences are not based solely on self-reﬂection:
Cognitive abilities are performance based (e.g., Hodson & Busseri, 2012),
heritability analyses are based on genetic similarity to others (e.g., Lewis &
Bates, 2010), and implicit measures tap less conscious associations between
objects and evaluations (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2004).
Nonetheless, the more conceptually proximal a predictor to prejudice, the
more conceptual overlap becomes a consideration. The most distal variables
(e.g., broad personality factors; genetic factors) do not directly (or obviously)
pertain to prejudice and thus present little concern. The same can be said for
variables conceptually downstream but likewise involve little overlap with
intergroup attitudes, such as cognitive abilities or NFC (neither of which
directly concerns group attitudes per se). Other types of variables, typically
considered mediators of distal variables on prejudice (such as RWA, SDO,
intergroup anxiety, and intergroup threat) vary in their conceptual relatedness
to prejudice. When considering these as prejudice predictors, it becomes
important to consider scale items carefully when interpreting ﬁndings. For
instance, some prejudice measures may themselves tap into anxiety and threat,
so relation magnitudes (and their meaning) may warrant reﬂection at the
interpretation stage. Also worth consideration is the level of abstraction of
the variables being assessed. For instance, at a high level of abstraction, the
commonality between RWA and SDO (i.e., generalised authoritarianism) can
more strongly predict generalised prejudices than either RWA or SDO on their
own (Hodson, MacInnis, & Busseri, 2015). Here, the greater the level of
abstraction of either authoritarianism or prejudices, the greater the association
between individual differences and prejudice. Thus overlap concerns will vary
depending on research question and the level of speciﬁcity vs. generality
examined. Finally, contextual factors also play a role, as when the association
between individual differences (e.g., SDO, or ITG-DS) and prejudice varies as
a function of manipulated threat, emotions, or contact (e.g., Choma et al.,
2012; Costello & Hodson, 2011; Hodson, Dube et al., 2015). Such research
explicitly acknowledges that overlap between constructs is not necessarily
static but contextually malleable.


























In discussing the importance of a person-based understanding of prejudice, we
have argued that the theoretical impasse between approaches favouring the
person or the situation is both sizeable yet unnecessary (Hodson, 2009). Our
goal is not to argue that one side is correct and the other incorrect; any such
interpretation would be a misreading of our central message. Instead we have
presented contemporary evidence that a range of individual differences matter to
prejudice, against a backdrop of theorising that has minimised their role and
relevance over the past 45 years or so. New tools and statistical methods are
uncovering evidence that factors such as genetic inﬂuences and unique (not
shared) situational experiences are far more important than was previously
imagined. The future of prejudice research arguably lies in the joint recognition
of both factors, as per our discussion of Person (P) × Situation (S) interactions
above (see Figure 6).
As illustrated in our opening quotation, Henri Tajfel, commonly upheld as a
pioneer for the “social” side of intergroup research, never intended for the person to
be ignored or dismissed, even in salient social contexts. In closing, we draw insights
from one of the ﬁeld’s other great conceptual pioneers, Gordon Allport (1954). His
seminal book The Nature of Prejudice emphasised social factors such as intergroup
categorisation, cultural plurality, intergroup contact, and child-rearing practices, but
several chapters were devoted to characteristics of the prejudiced person. He
concluded a personality chapter with the following observation:
. . . the basic fact is ﬁrmly established—prejudice is more than an incident in many
lives; it is often lockstitched into the very fabric of personality [italics added]. In such
cases it cannot be extracted by tweezers. To change it, the whole pattern of life would
have to be altered. (p. 408)
Some of the ﬁeld’s past de-emphasis of person-based factors is presumably
rooted in the belief that, if prejudice is deeply located and “inter-stitched” within
the person, there is little avenue for recourse. Although people differ system-
atically from one another in prejudicial expressions (see Table 2), we see promise
in prejudice interventions, especially intergroup contact, that target elements
(e.g., anxiety, threat, distrust) fuelling these person-based roots of prejudice. A
fuller understanding of the nature of prejudice (and efﬁcacious interventions)
arguably considers the person, the situation, and their interaction, in shaping
intergroup perceptions and reactions.
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